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Non-zero trajectories for long-run net migration assumptions in
global population projection models
Guy J. Abel1
Abstract
BACKGROUND
Little attention is given to the role of migration in global population projection models.
Most demographers set future levels of net migration on trajectories towards zero in all
countries, nullifying the impact of migration on long-run projected populations. Yet as
fertility and mortality rates fall, the role of migration on future population change is
becoming more pronounced.
OBJECTIVES
In this paper we develop future long-run migration scenarios to provide a range of
possible outcomes.
METHODS
Our alternative migration scenarios are linked to the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
(SSP), widely used in research on global environmental change. These are utilized as
inputs for a global cohort component projection model to obtain population totals up
until 2100 for all countries.
CONTRIBUTION
The results illustrate the important role of migration assumptions in long-run
projections, especially in post-demographic-transition countries. Further, they provide
plausible alternatives to projections based on the commonly used, but poorly justified,
convergence towards a zero net migration assumption.
1 Asian Demographic Research Institute, School of Sociology and Political Science, Shanghai University,
China and Wittgenstein Centre (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU), International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, Austria. Email: guy.abel@shu.edu.cn.
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1. Introduction
Long-run demographic projections are useful for assessing hypothetical future
population trends and their determinants. They help identify realistic development
targets and provide a base for other projections essential for social and economic
planning in fields such as climate, energy, and social security. International migration is
commonly considered as a major source of uncertainty in long-run global population
projections (National Research Council 2000) and an important driver of demographic
growth in many developed countries, often accounting for over half of the population
change (Lee 2011). The rise in the influence of migration is likely to spread to more
countries as fertility and mortality rates continue to fall in the developing world.
The accurate prediction of future international migration is one of the most
difficult challenges in long-run population projections. Data on past trends of
international migration flows, used to inform future assumptions, is often limited in
availability and comparability. Unlike other components of demographic change, there
is no overriding transition theory or agreed causal mechanisms to explain patterns of
international migration (Massey et al. 1993). Further, explanatory variables for social,
economic, and political factors that might aid the forecasting of future migration may be
as difficult to forecast as migration levels themselves (Bijak and Wiśniowski 2010).
Given the difficulties facing the prediction of future migration, methods based on
scenarios without any probabilistic statement attached are commonly used in population
projections produced by national statistics institutes and international organizations
(Bijak 2012; Howe and Jackson 2004). Global population projection models, the focus
of this paper, use similar scenario assumptions for the long-run future levels of
international migration. Migration assumptions in these models tend to follow the lead
of  the  United  Nations  (UN),  who  since  their  2010  version  of  the  World  Population
Prospects (WPP) have produced projections up until 2100 with a medium scenario
where net migration levels are assumed to follow a trajectory converging towards zero
in all countries from 2050 onwards.
In this paper we develop multiple migration scenarios and then incorporate them
into global population projections. Our scenarios are constructed to match long-run
migration patterns described in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) (O’Neill et
al. 2014), which are widely used in research on global environmental change. A range
of migration assumptions has a number of appealing properties. First, the use of
multiple scenarios helps users understand what aspects of populations and structures are
sensitive to alternative migration patterns and which are not affected (Lutz 1991).
Second, multiple scenarios that reflect policy-relevant future narratives directly
interpret possible outcomes, unlike a zero migration scenario (Booth 2006). Third, in
situations where statistical forecasts of demographic variables might have
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overwhelming levels of uncertainty, scenarios enable a better comprehension of the
impact of potential changes on population projections (Bijak 2011).
The first of these properties is of particular relevance in the context of global
population projection models where the standard procedure of setting a future net
migration on a trajectory towards zero in all countries is almost universally maintained.
This assumption reduces the role of migration as a driver of population change, despite
its prominent role in the demography of many countries. As Chamie (2016) discusses,
ignoring the likelihood of large-scale international migration flows in years ahead may
be politically expedient, especially for those advocating tightened borders and
restrictions for migrant admissions. However, doing so is shortsighted, misguided, and
ill-advised, and will undermine policy development, responsible planning, and program
readiness for the international migration exodus of the 21st century.
The SSP projections of net migration developed in this paper and the resulting
projected populations are purely deterministic with no probabilistic statement attached.
This follows the practice of other SSP projection exercises for other socioeconomic
measures. Probabilistic methods to forecast net migration for all countries have recently
been developed by Azose and Raftery (2015) and Azose, Ševčíková, and Raftery
(2016). These are not utilized in this paper, not only because the output is
nondeterministic but also because the inclusion of future migration levels to match
policy-relevant futures would involve a nontrivial elicitation of expert-based prior
distributions for future migration levels, and an even more complex alteration to their
model to incorporate the prior information.
This article proceeds with an overview of past net migration estimates provided by
the UN, followed by a review of the migration assumptions of the main producers of
world population projections, such as the UN, the US Census Bureau, and
demographers at the Wittgenstein Centre (WiC). In Section 4 a set of alternative
migration scenarios for all countries is proposed and discussed in the context of each
SSP. In Section 5 these alternative migration assumptions are used in a global
population projection model with the same future fertility and mortality rates. These are
compared with projections based on the UN assumption of a convergence towards zero
net migration in all countries. The results are discussed in the final section and are
related to potential future research in the area.
2. Net migration data
Global population projection requires both base data in the launch period and
assumptions regarding the future trajectory of each demographic component. Both the
UN Population Division and the US Census Bureau estimate net migration by age and
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sex over five-year periods for all countries. This section focuses on the UN estimates,
for three reasons. First, past versions of the UN net migration estimates are available,
allowing a study of past revisions. Second, the estimation methods used by the US
Census Bureau are similar to those of the UN (for an in-depth comparison, see Buettner
and Muenz 2016). Third, demographers at WiC use estimates of bilateral migration
flows from a global demographic accounting framework that sum to the UN net
migration estimates in each country (summing all the immigration flows by origin and
then subtracting all the emigration flows by destination).
Official statistics on net migration that match the five-year interval commonly
used as a timing interval when developing global population projections are in very
short supply. There are a number of reasons for the lack of data. First, no country can
collect statistics on the number of net migrants as they are a nonexistent population
(Rogers  1990).  Second,  most  countries  do  not  collect  the  data  on  the  number  of
immigrants and emigrants that might enable a net migration estimate to be produced.
Third, in countries that do collect data on the number of immigrants and emigrants the
data often lacks adequate measurements of volume, direction, and completeness (Kelly
1987; Kupiszewska and Nowok 2008; Willekens 1994). Finally, where an adequate
data collection system exists, migration statistics are not commonly published over
five-year time intervals or aligned to the same points of time as the projection launch
period.
For these reasons, net migration values produced by the UN are estimated based on
a combination of intercensal net residuals derived from population accounting and
official migration statistics, where they exist. Estimates might represent not only net
migration counts but also accumulated statistical errors from population, fertility, and
mortality measures. Further statistical errors might result from adjustments carried out
to ensure that the total global net migration is zero in each five-year period.
The UN does not provide disaggregation of net migration values by age and sex, as
required in cohort component projection models,. However, such data can be indirectly
estimated given age-specific population, birth, and death data. 2  UN documentation
notes that their disaggregation of estimated net migration is dependent on the
participation of men and women in different types of flows for any given country (i.e.,
labor migration, family reunification, etc.). Where no existing age disaggregation exists,
2 For the 2008, 2010, and 2012 WPP versions, net migration data by age and sex for all countries are available
in R packages (Ševčíková et al. 2013; Ševčíková and Gerland 2013). Within the help files of the net migration
data a disclaimer notes that the data is for illustrative purposes only and incorporates statistical adjustment
errors. For the 2008 and 2010 versions, past estimates go back to 1990‒1995; for the 2012 version, estimates
go back to 1950‒1955. Net migration data by age and sex is not available in the WPP2015 and WPP2017 R
packages (Ševčíková 2017; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division
2015b) but an R function to indirectly derive these values via demographic accounting is provided.
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model age schedules are used to distribute the overall net number of male and female
migrants by age group according to the dominant type of migration flow assumed; for
example, labor migration or family migration (United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs Population Division 2014: 37). For full details on the methodology
used to estimate past net migration, see the UN methodology literature (for example,
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division 2017).
3. Future migration scenarios
The development of future migration assumptions can be separated into two
components. The first involves adjustments to alter levels of migration in the immediate
future. These are typically carried out on a country-by-country basis using expert
opinion. In the second component, migration levels are set according to assumptions
about the global migration system. In this section we briefly discuss both of these
components in reference to the migration assumptions used in global population
projections published by the UN, the US Census Bureau, and researchers at the
Wittgenstein Centre. A more comprehensive discussion of comparisons between the
future migration scenarios used by each of these groups can be found in Buettner and
Muenz (2016).
3.1 The short and medium run
In countries where migration plays an important role, demographers often adjust
migration levels to assumptions in the immediate future in response to the social,
political, and economic climate. In both the past and present versions of the WPP,
experts at the UN adjust the size and direction of the changes in net migration during
the initial projection periods based on available migration statistics, national
governments’ views on international migration, estimates of undocumented migrants,
and data on refugee movement (United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs Population Division 2014: 37). In some countries these changes can be
immediate, with sudden shifts from past patterns to levels in the next projection periods,
which are then kept constant up until 2050. For other countries it is assumed that the
change in net migration can be a slower process, drifting over a couple of decades
towards a level which is then held in the medium-to-long term.
Both the US Census Bureau and the WiC use expert assumptions to make
modifications to future migration levels in their projections, using similar arguments to
the UN. As Coleman (2004) noted, when making population projection assumptions for
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net receiving countries, expert-driven levels for future migration invariably posit a rapid
decline in net immigration, partly so as not to contradict national government policy
aimed at minimizing inflows and partly due to the difficulty of working out what will
happen in the future.
3.2 The long run
Throughout recent WPP versions the UN have used two migration scenarios in their
projection models: a medium migration scenario and a zero migration scenario. The
zero migration scenario is typically used only once, to enable a clearer understanding of
natural population change.3
In recent versions of the WPP, net migration assumptions have been set until 2100,
whereafter 2050 levels in all countries are assumed to converge at a linear rate towards
zero. In both WPP2010 and WPP2012 net migration is assumed to converge to zero by
2095‒2100 in all countries. In WPP2015 and WPP2017 net migration converges
towards zero but at a slower rate than in previous versions, reaching 50% of the 2045‒
2050 value in the last projection period. The justification for the use of a convergence-
towards-zero assumption appears to be twofold. First, the use of net migration counts in
population projection models makes it possible to project a negative population. With a
convergence-towards-zero assumption this is unlikely to happen, as the size of net
migration shrinks. Second, zero net migration is taken as a default value due to lack of
knowledge of the long-run future of migration in all countries. These justifications are
discussed below.
Unlike a projection model based on migration rates, net migration counts bear no
relation to the population at risk. Consequently, a migration count measure is unable to
respond to changes in population size or structure. This could be problematic in a
shrinking population with low fertility, as a projection model based on net migration
counts might depopulate the country. For example, consider an elderly country with low
fertility and high levels of net emigration. In the long run if the number of emigrants
remains constant a projection model can potentially result in a negative population, as it
continuously subtracts migrants in each future period regardless of the population at
risk. By shrinking future net migration towards zero, demographers avoid this potential
hazard.
3 Note that the use of the label ‘zero migration’ for this scenario is slightly misleading. A better label might be
‘balanced migration,’ where net migration is zero in all countries (the number of immigrants over each period
matches the number of emigrants in all countries) as opposed to there being no (zero) migration.
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Both the UN and demographers at WiC share the common practice of converging
migration in all countries towards zero after 2050. This effectively subdues the role of
migration as a component of population change and can be considered an unsatisfactory
practice for two reasons. First, demographic scholars such as Coleman (2004) and
Chamie (2016) (amongst others) have noted that mass migration, or at least migration
pressure, is a growing influence in many countries and is unlikely to end in 2050. In the
absence of new effective policies to stem it, migration will continue to make substantial
contributions to populations in both Northern America and Western Europe. Second,
the  convergence  towards  zero  adjustment  is  justified  in  the  WPP  literature  by  a
complete lack of knowledge concerning future migration after 2050 (United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division 2016). This
justification is flawed, as it uses a probabilistic statement on uncertainty in relation to a
deterministic scenario. Zero net migration, as with any other value of net migration,
should not be considered as a representation of uncertainty.
There are additional implications when demographers adopt a net migration
scenario with trajectories towards zero in all countries: (1) migration will have a
declining influence on population change; (2) the beginning and end of the convergence
towards zero net migration will occur at the same time and at a constant speed in all
countries; and (3) at the end of the convergence the global migration system will be in
perfect balance, with all countries having equal numbers of immigrants and emigrants.
This last implication is particularly unusual in a historical context: There is no
precedent of a global migration system in perfect balance, nor is there any indication in
the recent data of a convergence towards such a state during recent periods.
These unsatisfactory consequences suggest that it is necessary to explore
alternative scenarios of net migration in projection models. To this end, in the
remainder of this paper we develop alternative long-run net migration assumptions that
(1) provide a range of scenarios to help illustrate the role of migration in projected
populations and (2) are more relevant to possible policy concerns than those currently
employed by demographers.
4. Alternative long-run migration scenarios
In recent years the development of future migration scenarios has become more
sophisticated. As part of the International Futures Project, the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development developed five scenarios to help assess how
migration flows might evolve in the coming years up until 2030, and their important
economic and social implications (OECD 2009). The Global Migration Futures project
developed a framework for constructing migration scenarios (Paoletti, de Haas, and
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Vargas-Silva 2010) and looked in depth at potential trends in selected regions.
However, none of these narrative-based scenarios involved quantifying future levels of
long-run migration or entering them into a population projection model to measure
potential demographic impacts.
Motivated by demand from the climate change community, O’Neill et al. (2014)
detailed the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP), a set of five alternative narratives
to describe possible world futures up to 2100. The SSPs enable a common set of
assumptions in social and climate sciences to help facilitate integrated research and
assessment. Each narrative provides descriptive assumptions of future demographic
outcomes alongside other elements such as human development, economy and lifestyle,
policies and institutions, technology and environment, and natural resources. The
narratives represent positions in a two-dimensional space, based on a scale of future
socioeconomic challenges for adaptation to climate change and a scale of future
socioeconomic challenges for mitigation from climate change.
Demographers based at WiC applied multidimensional demographic methods to
project national populations based on alternative assumptions of future fertility,
mortality, migration, and educational transitions that correspond to the five SSPs (KC
and Lutz 2014; Lutz, Butz, and KC 2014; Sander, Abel, and Riosmena 2014).
Migration was projected based on assumptions of immigration and emigration rates,
derived in the base period from estimates of bilateral migration flows obtained using the
methodology of Abel and Sander (2014). Up until 2050, immigration and emigration
rates take high (SSP5), medium (SSP1, SSP2 and SSP4), or low (SSP3) levels after
some short-run adjustments. Thereafter, immigration and emigration levels are adjusted
so that the residual net migration converges to zero by 2095‒2100, following the lead of
the UN.
A closer inspection of the SSP literature and its discussion of migration reveals
that the convergence of net-migration-to-zero assumptions, used by KC and Lutz (2014)
in  all  SSPs,  does  not  fully  reflect  the  different  narratives.  Table  1  shows  extracts  of
mentions of migration from the detailed description of the SPP narratives in O’Neill et
al. (2017). None of these imply a global migration system in perfect balance (with zero
net migration in all countries) or convergence towards a similar state.
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Table 1: References to migration in each SSP in the supplementary materials
of O’Neill et al. (2017)
SSP1: Sustainability – Taking the Green Road
Migration is at intermediate levels. Although increasing integration of labour markets allows
people to move around more freely, improved regional livelihoods and the renewed emphasis on
regional production reduce migration incentives.
SSP2: Middle of the Road
Migration between countries continues at intermediate levels owing to the restriction of labour
markets, but there are intermittent periods of greater international migration when populations
are challenged by food insecurity, conflict, and other factors.
SSP3: Regional Rivalry – A Rocky Road
In high-income countries, economic uncertainty leads to low fertility. Combined with low levels of
international migration, this leads to rapid ageing in industrialized countries.
SSP4: Inequality – A Road Divided
Migration is high for richer groups, but difficult for low-income groups
SSP5: Fossil-Fuelled Development – Taking the Highway
Migration from poorer to wealthier countries buffers the effect of ageing populations in
industrialized countries.
In the remainder of this section we propose alternative migration scenarios based
on net migration counts. In combination with the UN medium migration scenario, the
new assumptions allow for a better understanding of the range of potential future
populations. Further, these scenarios are directly linked to SSP narratives via available
GDP projections for each future pathway. The proposed migration scenarios could also
be of potential use in answering common ‘what if’ type questions that policymakers and
other users of population projections might ask.
Our new migration scenarios are developed in two stages. The first stage is based
on a persistence assumption that is related to SSP2. In the second stage the other SSPs
are developed in relation to SSP2 using existing SSP projections for Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).
4.1 Persistence scenario (SSP2)
The SSP literature suggests that the SSP2 (‘Middle of the Road’) narrative represents a
future where current trends continue more or less at levels observed in the recent past.
Global emissions are projected to more or less follow recent trends, and whilst there are
substantial challenges for mitigation and adaptation, neither is particularly severe
(O’Neill et al. 2017). In order to reflect this future we use a persistence assumption: The
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net migration estimate in WPP2017 for the 2010–2015 period is assumed to remain
constant throughout the entire projection period. This assumption was implemented in
all countries except the Central African Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Syria, and
Turkey. In these six nations the persistence value was set to the 2005‒2010 net
migration count, as during the 2010‒2015 period net migration levels were extreme in
comparisons with their historical values. The criteria for an extreme level were based on
country-specific Z-scores (based on net migration counts between 1950‒1955 and
2010‒2015) reaching above plus or minus 2.5. As the substitutions created a non-zero
sum of global net migration, small proportional adjustments were made in all countries.
The implementation of our persistence assumption in a global population
projection model has a number of other useful benefits besides the link with the SSP2.
First, the results can be used to conduct a comparison with the UN medium scenario.
This allows for a quantification of the role of UN experts in their population projections
when setting future levels of net migration, both before and after their post-2050
convergence-towards-zero trajectory. Second, in many economic and financial time
series applications the use of a naïve forecast – i.e., a persistence assumption – for
complex processes has been found to perform better than, or similar to, alternatives
based on intricate forecasting models (Hyndman and Athanasopoulos 2013). Third, the
persistence assumption matches a similar scenario used by the US Census Bureau for
their long-run population projections (which stop at 2050).
4.2 Other scenarios (SSP1, SSP3, SSP4, and SSP5)
Developing net migration scenarios can only be undertaken by adjusting the balance of
each country in the migration system. As global net migration must sum to zero it is not
possible to operationalize a scenario using net migration counts where, for example,
there is increasing migration in all countries. If all countries witnessed an increase in
net migration a global net migration balance of zero would no longer exist; hence an
increase in net migration counts in one country must be counterbalanced by decreases
elsewhere.
With this restriction in mind, we created migration scenarios for the remaining
SSPs by linking them to relative changes in future shares of global economic wealth, a
factor that is closely associated with international migration. Dellink et al. (2017) and
Crespo Cuaresma (2017) have recently developed separate economic projections for the
SSPs. We utilize the results from the former of these SSP projections, as the latter is (1)
closely linked to the human capital projections of K.C. and Lutz (2014) that have
existing migration assumptions, and (2) covers fewer countries than Dellink et al.
(2017).
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The future SSP scenarios by Dellink et al. (2017) for GDP (in 2005 US$) in each
continent are shown in the left hand column of Figure 1.4 In some scenarios, such as
SSP5, GDP is increasing in all  areas at a fast pace. As mentioned, it  is not possible to
develop net migration scenarios that simply match these increases, as global net
migration must sum to zero. Hence, a process to link future net migration to changes in
future shares of global economic wealth was undertaken. This involved calculating
future SSP1, SSP3, SSP4, and SSP5 shares of global economic wealth relative to the
shares of global economic wealth in SSP2. The trajectories of these shares were then
used to scale up or down the net migration assumption of SSP2 in each of the remaining
SSPs. The amplitude of our scaling was based on historic variation in past net migration
flows to ensure that future net migration trajectories are bounded to sensible ranges. A
final rescaling was carried out to ensure that the global net migration sums to zero in all
countries. Full technical details of the process to derive net migration trajectories in
SSP1, SSP3, SSP4, and SSP5 are provided in the Appendix.
4.3 Net migration trajectories
The net migration trajectories, summed to the continental level for each set of SSPs, are
shown in the middle column of Figure 1, accompanied by the historic net migration and
future assumptions used by the UN in WPP2017. In all countries (and continents) the
SSP2 is fixed at the last observed level. In the other scenarios the trajectories of net
migration are set relative to the change in GDP in SSP2 (plotted in the left-hand column
in Figure 1). The linkage between the GDP and net migration trajectories are most
clearly visible for SSP5 (‘Fossil-Fuelled Development – Taking the Highway’).  In  all
continents, GDP increases rapidly over time. However, relative to SSP2, in the first half
of the projection period the increases in GDP are fastest in Asia and Africa, and in the
second half (where the gap between the GDP of SSP2 and SSP5 increasingly widens)
are faster in Europe, North America, and Oceania. This results in net migration first
rising in Asia and Africa and then declining thereafter, matched by decreases in net
migration in Europe and North America followed by rapid increases.
4 Figure produced using ggplot2 package (Wickham 2009) in R (R Development Core Team 2016).
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Figure 1: GDP and linked Net Migration SSP assumptions aggregated to
continental regions with associated projected population totals
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Within each continent there are distinct differences in trajectories, as described in
Table 2. For, example, in SSP5, Southern Africa follows a similar pattern to that shown
in Figure 1 for Latin America, where as in Eastern Europe net migration undergoes a
continuous decline in the second half of the projection period.
Table 2: SSP net migration trajectories5
Continent Scenario
SSP1: Sustainability –
Taking the Green Road
SSP3: Regional rivalry –
A Rocky Road
SSP4: Inequality –
A Road Divided
SSP5: Fossil-fuelled
development –
Taking the Highway
Africa Increasing net migration to
positive levels in Northern,
Eastern, Middle, and
Western Africa, peaking
around 2070–2075.
Gradual declines in
Southern Africa net
migration throughout
period.
Further declines of net
migration in Eastern,
Middle, and Western
Africa. Small declines in
net migration in Northern
and Southern Africa until
2060–2065 and then
rising levels thereafter.
Steep declines in net
migration away from
Eastern, Northern, and
Western Africa throughout
period. Shallower
declines in Middle Africa.
Stable net migration
trajectory for Southern
Africa.
Similar trajectories as
SSP1 in Eastern,
Middle, and Western
and Southern Africa with
earlier peaks in the
former three.
Persistence-level net
migration in Northern
Africa until 2055–2060;
falling levels thereafter.
Asia Steep increases in net
migration in South-Central
and South-Eastern Asia
until 2060–2065, with
equally steep declines
thereafter until 2100. Steep
declines in net migration in
Western Asia until 2060–
2065, steady thereafter.
Small gentle declining
trajectory of net migration
in Eastern Asia.
Rising net migration in
Eastern, South-Eastern,
and Western Asia, with
especially large increases
in the latter half of the
projection period in
South-Eastern Asia. Slow
falling net migration in
South-Central Asia.
Steep declines in net
migration in South-Central
and South-Eastern Asia
throughout trajectory.
Steep increases in net
migration in Eastern and
Western Asia.
Small increases in net
migration in South-
Central and South-
Eastern Asia in the first
half of the projection
period and then falls
thereafter. Small
declines in net migration
in Western Asia
throughout period.
Declining net migration
in Eastern Asia in first
half of projection period,
then stable.
Europe Declining net migration in
all regions in first half of
projection period followed
by similar-sized increase in
second half in all regions
but Eastern Europe –
where net migration
continues to decline in the
second half of the
projection period.
Persistence level of net
migration until 2045–2050
in all regions, then falling
net migration in Northern,
Southern, and Western
Europe for the rest of the
projection period.
Increasing net migration
in Eastern Europe in the
second half of the
projection period.
Increasing net migration
trajectories throughout the
period.
Similar trajectories as
SSP1 but with increases
setting in earlier and
rising to higher levels in
the latter part of the
projection period in
Northern, Southern, and
Western Europe.
5  In SSP2 (‘Middle of the Road’), net migration trajectories persist at 2010–2015 levels throughout the
projection period.
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Table 2: (Continued)
Continent Scenario
SSP1: Sustainability –
Taking the Green Road
SSP3: Regional rivalry –
A Rocky Road
SSP4: Inequality –
A Road Divided
SSP5: Fossil-fuelled
development –
Taking the Highway
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
Small steady declines of net
migration in Central and
Southern America.
Fluctuations around
persistence levels of net
migration in Caribbean.
Increasing net migration
trajectories throughout the
period.
Small gradual increases
in net migration.
Steep declines in net
migration in first half of
projection period,
followed by shallower
declines in second half.
North America Declining net migration in
first half of projection period
followed by similar-sized
increase in second half.
Small gradual fluctuations
of net migration around
persistence levels.
Steady increase in net
migration throughout
period.
Similar trajectories as
SSP1 but with increases
setting in earlier and
rising to higher levels in
the latter part of the
projection period.
Oceania Small declines in net
migration in first half of
projection period, followed
by faster increases in
second half.
Declines in net migration
in the second half of the
projection period.
Large increases in net
migration in first half of
projection period, which
remains at high levels
during the second half.
Similar trajectories as
SSP1 but with increases
setting in earlier and
rising to higher levels in
the latter part of the
projection period.
The net migration trajectory for SSP1 (‘Taking the Green Road’) is a less extreme
version of SSP5 in many areas, with a rising net migration in parts of Asia and Africa
offset by falling net migration in Europe and North America during the first half the
projection period, which then flips in the second half of the period due to shifts in the
relative shares of global economic wealth. In SSP3 (‘Regional Rivalry’), net migration
in many countries follows levels similar to the SSP2 equivalent in the first half of the
projection period. In the second half of the projection period, Europe and Oceania see
falls  in  net  migration  balanced  by  gains  in  Asia  and  Latin  America.  In  SSP4
(‘Inequality ‒ A Road Divided’), net migration quickly increases in Europe, North
America, and Oceania throughout the period, offset by declines in Africa and Asia.
5. Population projection under alternative migration scenarios
We used the assumed future net migration counts in each of the SSP scenarios
described in Section 4 as inputs in a global cohort component population projection
model based on net migration counts. This allows for two comparisons: (1) comparison
of the effect of SSP net migration scenarios and their potential effect on future
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populations, and (2) comparison of the SSP2 persistence assumption with the WPP2017
assumption.6 This latter comparison quantifies the effect of expert judgment used by the
UN in setting (1) country-specific adjustments in the short run, (2) country-specific
medium-run levels of net migration set up until 2045‒2050, and 3) the global
convergence towards zero trend after 2045‒2050.
Net migration counts for each age and gender group, required for the cohort
component model, were obtained by applying the corresponding country- and period-
specific proportional disaggregation found in the WPP2017 medium assumption. 7
Projections were performed using the pop.predict() function in the bayesPop package
(Ševčíková and Raftery 2014, 2016) for R. In each projection the medians of the UN
probabilistic forecasts of fertility and mortality were used by setting the number of
trajectories to one. Projections for all countries up until 2100 were then obtained.
The SSP net migration assumptions provide a range of alternative projected
population outcomes, as shown in the right hand column of Figure 1. In Africa the 2100
population ranges from 4,219 million under SSP4 to 4,493 million under SSP1. The
WPP2017 projection is within this range: 4,400 million in 2100. In Figure 2 the
differences in the population projected by the WPP2017 net migration assumptions and
each of the SSP net migration assumptions are plotted. In Africa only the projected
population of the Southern Africa region is noticeably impacted by alternative net
migration assumptions. In this region the 2100 projected populations for the SSPs are
between 12% (SSP5) and 17% (SSP3) higher than those obtained from the WPP2017
assumptions. The most noticeable difference is in the underlying net migration
assumptions for South Africa, where the UN assumes immediate declines in net
migration to 100,000 from much higher levels observed in the recent past. The SSP
scenarios have higher net migration, as SSP2 is based on a persistence assumption (net
migration was estimated to be above 500,000 in four of the five most recent five-year
periods) and the other SSPs are set up relative to the persistence level.
6 Note: WPP2017 projection refers throughout this section to the default population projections returned by
the pop.predict() function, rather than the official data in the DVD of the United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs Population Division (2017). Outputs from the R package do not always match
official UN figures. These discrepancies are due to a variety of reasons, such as the lack of publicly available
data on fertility, mortality, and migration for smaller nations and of age-specific net migration counts for all
countries.
7 Obtained by applying the age.specific.migration() function in the wpp2017 R package.
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Figure 2: Comparison of UN WPP projected populations in 2100 with
alternative projection populations using SSP net migration levels
In Asia the future 2100 population ranges from 4,830 million in SSP4 to 4,891
million in SSP3 (see Figure 1). Projected populations in all SSP scenarios are higher
than the equivalent projected population of 4,763 million under the WPP2017
assumptions. This lower population is driven by the far lower levels of negative net
migration  assumed  by  the  UN:  The  SSP2  scenario  assumes  a  net  migration  of  ‒5.4
million migrants in each five-year period before 2050, compared to ‒7.82 million in
WPP2017. While at the continental level the comparative differences might appear
minor relative to the overall population size, there are larger differences at smaller
geographic levels where intra-Asian migration trends are not aggregated and countries
where international migration plays a key role in population change are not
overwhelmed by population giants such as China and India. As shown in Figure 2, in
Western Asia, home to countries with large positive net migration in recent decades,
such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, the 2100 population is 35%
higher when using the SSP2 persistence assumption than the WPP2017 projection. The
highest overall population for Western Asia was obtained from SSP3, where the 2100
population is 49% higher than the equivalent WPP2017 population. The large
differences are generated by comparatively low levels of net migration in WPP2017 for
oil-rich Gulf States, assumed with near immediate effect.
In Europe the SSP net migration assumptions lead to some drastic differences in
projected population trajectories, ranging from 5,520 million in SSP1 to 793 million in
SSP4 (shown in Figure 1). The equivalent projected population from WPP2017 net
migration assumptions was 657 million. In all scenarios the population declines from
the 2015 base year. However, in SSP5 the projected population hits a minimum before
2090 and then increases once more. The greatest disparities between the 2100 SSP and
WPP2017 projected populations occur in Southern Europe where the SSPs have lower
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totals (the most extreme being 59% lower in SSP1), and Western Europe where the SSP
populations are higher (the most extreme being 37% higher in SSP4).
In Latin America and the Caribbean each projected population follows a similar
trajectory of a peak around 2060 and a decline thereafter (see Figure 1). In all but SSP3,
the SSP projections for 2100 populations are lower than equivalent WPP2017 totals.
The differences are greatest in the Caribbean region, most noticeably in SSP5 (Figure
2), where the 2100 projected population is 17% lower than in WPP2017.
In Northern America the different SSP net migration assumptions have a large
influence on the projected population. The SSP2 persistence assumption has a similar
2100 population total to the WPP2017 projection, despite differences in the underlying
net migration trajectories. This 2100 projected population falls almost midway between
the SSP1 and SSP4 projections of 457 million and 566 million respectively (Figure 1).
Finally, in Oceania all SSP net migration assumptions lead to higher population
totals in 2100 than WPP2015 assumptions (Figure 1). The higher populations are
almost entirely in Australia and New Zealand, where in SSP4 the 2100 population is
37% higher than the WPP2017 projection. In SSP5, the fossil-fuelled development
narrative, there is a 59% decline in the Polynesian population, related to sharp falls in
share of the global economic wealth.
6. Discussion
Future assumptions of international migration are a necessary component of global
population projection exercises. Typically, the effect of migration in the long run is
subdued by assuming a convergence towards zero net migration in all countries. As we
explored in this paper, this assumption has a number of potential weaknesses. There
appears to be no overwhelming justification for the convergence-towards-zero
assumption when recent work on forecasting long-run migration ignores the assumption
(Azose and Raftery 2015; Cohen 2012) and studies on the role of migration in the UN
projections suggest it is very unlikely (Billari and Dalla-Zuanna 2013), as does the UN
Population Division itself (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Population Division 2016). The end state of zero net migration in all countries has not
been observed in recorded human history. Data in the recent past shows no tendency
towards such a future.
The convergence towards a zero-net-migration assumption is typically
implemented as a linear rise or fall, beginning and ending at the same time in each
country. It is a relatively complex assumption when compared to the persistence
assumption (SSP2) explored in this paper. It inherently implies a turning point in the
trends of net migration in all countries. For example, net migration in countries such as
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the United States or Australia has been continuously positive for many decades. In the
future, migration patterns in these traditional receiving countries will dramatically
change as net migration falls toward zero. Such complexity might be unwarranted,
given the lack of consensus by scholars on the long-run future of migration patterns.
Further, in other complex forecasting settings, naïve forecasts, analogous to a
persistence assumption, have been relatively successful in comparison to more complex
models.
The use of multiple migration scenarios illustrates some future potential variation
in population projections from migration that is not provided for when considering a
single variant, as used by the UN. For example, in Europe the SSP projections proposed
in this paper show a range of projected population trajectories, some of which do not
imply a continued decline in the European population. Due to the deep levels of
complexity in the global migration system and uncertainty as to future directions, the
use of scenarios appears to be an appropriate tool. Similar scenario-based approaches
are the dominant approach in projections of other complex systems such as climate
change, where realistic probabilistic measures of uncertainty can become overwhelming
and are unable to reflect policy-relevant narratives.
The alternative scenarios proposed in this paper were constructed to align the long-
run migration futures described in the SSP narratives. Unlike KC and Lutz (2014),
migration in each SSP was not set on a trajectory to reach zero during the last projection
period for all countries, allowing the full role of migration to be borne by the end of the
projection period. Net migration levels of the SSP2 ‒ the ‘Middle of the Road’ narrative
‒ were set to persist throughout the projection period, which then allowed other SSPs to
track relative changes in country shares of global economic wealth, obtained from
existing SSP projections of GDP. In some extreme cases, in small island states this
leads to shrinking populations by 2100 under the SSP5 narrative, ‘Fossil Fuelled
Development.’ Less dramatic effects could be obtained by tweaking the multiplier (to
values less than two when implemented in Step 3 of the methodology) used to scale the
limits for the non-SSP2 future net migration levels from the persistence assumption.
One might also experiment with the construction of the persistence assumptions, such
as taking an average over a historic range of periods.
Future work on migration scenarios for global population projections might
involve similar linkages of existing SSP measures to more detailed measures of
migration. Recent estimates of past global bilateral migration (Abel 2013, 2017; Abel
and Sander 2014) could be utilized. This would allow for a full multi-regional global
population projection model (as proposed by Cohen et al. (2008) or a simpler bi-
regional model (as implemented in Abel, KC, and Sander (2013) and Lutz et al.
(2014)), rather than a projection model based on net migration counts. One possible
procedure to link migration and the existing SSP literature is to build a regression-type
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model for the relationship of past bilateral migration flows with past drivers of
migration such as distance, cultural similarity, language, population size and structure,
human capital, income inequality, migration, and aging policies. Where SSP measures
of the migration driver variable exist or the variable itself is time-invariant (e.g.,
distance), projections of bilateral migration can be generated using parameter estimates
from the fitted models based on past data. In different SSP scenarios the parameters
might be set to increase or decrease future migration levels to better reflect the narrative
in the context of migration.
Formulating long-run assumptions for international migration is a difficult but
necessary task when carrying out global population projection models. The additional
long-run migration scenarios presented in this paper provide plausible alternative
trajectories for future populations with a direct link to the existing economic projections
of the SSPs. Further, the alterative scenarios reveal where long-run migration
assumptions have a major influence in global population projection models, a feature
commonly missing in current assumptions.
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Appendix
We undertook a four-step process to link future net migration to changes in future
shares of global economic wealth.
1. Derive country (c)-period (p) specific measures for shares for global economic
wealth in each SSP (s) based on the GDP estimates of Dellink et al. (2017):
݃௖௣
௦ = ீ஽௉೎೛ೞ
∑ ீ஽௉೎೛
ೞ
೎
.
2. Calculate the relative size of the share of global GDP in each country-period and in
each scenario (SSP1, SSP3, SSP4, and SSP5) relative to the corresponding SSP2
global GDP share.
ݓ௖௣
௦ = ௚೎೛ೞ
௚೎೛
ೄೄುమ.
This provides a basis for creating country period-specific future net migration
assumptions relative to the SSP2 persistence assumption (where	ݓ௖௣ௌௌ௉ଶ = 1). For
example, if a country gains a larger share of global economic wealth in SSP1 than
in SSP2 (i.e., ݓ௖௣௦ > 1),	then the assumed level of net migration in SSP1 is based
on a scaled-up version of net migration SSP2 (persistence assumption).
3. The range of ݓ௖௣௦  is relatively small, with a standard deviation of 0.0659 in 2095–
2100  across  all  counties  and  scenarios.  When  used  as  a  multiplier  for  the  SSP2
persistence values to derive non-SPP2 assumptions, the resulting differences are
minor. This is due to differences in the measurement scales of relative GDP shares
and net migration counts. In order to provide a more viable range of outcomes,
ݓ௖௣
௦  are rescaled to provide a range of net migration multipliers (݉௖௣௦ , with a lower
boundary ݈௖  and an upper boundary ݑ௖)  over all SSPs and all periods,
corresponding to plus and minus two standard deviations from the persistence
level (ݕ௖ௌௌ௉ଶ)	of net migration in each country, i.e.:
݈௖ = ୫୧୬ೞ೛ ௬೎௬೎ೄೄುమ , where min௦௣ ݕ௖ = ݕ௖ௌௌ௉ଶ − 2ߪ௖ ,
ݑ௖ = ୫ୟ୶ೞ೛ ௬೎௬೎ೄೄುమ  , where max௦௣ ݕ௖ = ݕ௖ௌௌ௉ଶ + 2ߪ௖ .
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Two was chosen as a multiplier for the standard deviations in order to provide
bounds on the range for future net migration, based on past variation that covers
approximately 95% of possible values. The range between the upper and lower
bounds should not be interpreted as a statistical prediction interval, as they are to
be used in a projection exercise and will be modified further in the next step. The
country-specific standard deviations are based on non-extreme past net migration
counts, where extreme values were based on Z-scores (past data with Z-scores
greater than plus or minus 2.5 were dropped from the standard deviation
calculation).
The ranges for new multiples are applied to rescale	ݓ௖௣௦ ;
݉௖௣
௦ = ௨೎ି	௟೎
୫ୟ୶ೞ೛௪೎ି	୫୧୬ೞ೛௪೎
൫ݓ௖௣
௦ − max௦௣ݓ௖൯ + ݑ௖ .
These multipliers were applied to the SSP2 persistence assumption values to
obtain net migration assumptions for all other SSPs with limits over all periods and
scenarios bounded by two standard deviations:
ݕ௖௣
௦ = ݉௖௣௦ ݕ௖௣ௌௌ௉ଶ.
4. A small proportional adjustment to ensure the global sum of ݕ௖௣௦  over all countries
in  each  period  and  scenario  sum  to  zero.  Further  details  of  the  choice  of  global
adjustment method are given below.
The resulting assumptions, summed to the continental level for each set of SSPs,
are shown in the middle column of Figure 1, accompanied by the historic net migration
and future assumptions used by the UN in WPP2017.
Scaling to ensure global net migration sums to zero
In Step 4 of the methodology to link GDP trajectories to net migration, the initial values
of ݕ௖௣௦  are scaled to ensure that the sum of net migration in each scenario and each
period is zero. There are a number of methods to carry out the scaling. One method
consists of subtracting the mean net migration flow (ݕത௖௣௦ ) from ݕ௖௣௦ ,:
ݕො௖௣
௦ = ݕ௖௣௦ − ݕത௖௣௦ ,
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to obtain the scaled flows,	ݕො௖௣௦ , that sum to zero. This method does not perform well for
countries with small net migration values. The shift upwards or downwards from the
mean level can result in a country switching from positive net migration to negative net
migration (or vice-versa). Further, if the mean net migration value is not close to zero it
can create unrealistically large net migration values in small countries. For this reason,
an  alternative  method  was  used  that  ensures  that  countries  do  not  switch  from  net
sending to net receiving countries or vice-versa, whereby weights are calculated and
applied separately for positive net migration values (݅௖௣௦ ) and negative net migration
values (݁௖௣௦ ):
ݕො௖௣
௦ = ቊ݅௖௣௦ ܽ௖௣௦
݁௖௣
௦ ܾ௖௣
௦ .
The weights ܽ௖௣௦ = ∑ ௜೎೛ೞ೎ ିௗ೛ೞ∑ ௜೎೛ೞ೎  scale the positive net migration values, while the
weights ܾ௖௣௦ = ∑ ௘೎೛ೞ೎ ିௗ೛ೞ∑ ௘೎೛ೞ೎  scale the negative values. Both weights are linked by half of the
difference in the positive and negative net migration values ݀௣௦ = ∑ ௜೎೛ೞ೎ ି∑ ௜೎೛ೞ೎ଶ  to ensure
the scaled flows,	ݕො௖௣௦ , sum to zero.
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